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A STRIKE AT THE HEART OF DEMOCRACY:
WHY LEGAL CHALLENGES TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS SHOULD SUCCEED
Alysia Robben*
INTRODUCTION

The ability to vote is considered a fundamental right, "preservative of all

rights."1 The essence of a republican democracy is to choose one's representa-

tives and, thus, have a voice in the collective governance of our society. The right
is both revered as sacred and feared - it is constantly under attack precisely because of the power it has. Since the enfranchisement of freed slaves, the AfricanAmerican vote in particular has been viewed as a threat to dominant political

forces, and in turn significant efforts have been made to suppress that vote. Due
to the protection of the right to vote afforded by the Constitution, Congress, and
the courts, many barriers to African-American suffrage have been struck down,2
but one substantial disenfranchisement measure remains lawful: criminal disenfranchisement. The felon and ex-felon population represents "the largest single
group of American citizens who are barred by law from participating in elections."' 3 African-Americans make up a disproportionately large amount of that
group. One report estimates that based on current rates of incarceration, "three
in ten of the next generation of black men can expect to be disenfranchised at
4
some point in their lifetime."
In response to the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, states created clever,
facially neutral barriers to impede the African-American vote. These efforts included the poll tax, which claimed to be an effort to raise money; the literacy test,
which was a supposed effort to raise the quality of the electorate; and, felon disenfranchisement, which claimed "to preserve the purity of the ballot box.", 5 To*
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1 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
2 Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the "Menace of Negro Domination": Racial
Threat and Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559, 560 (2003)
[hereinafter Ballot Manipulation].

3

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN

THE UNITED STATES

308 (2000).

4 The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States 1 (Nov. 2005),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf.

5

KEYSSAR,

supra note 3, at 163 (citing Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (Ala. 1884)).
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day a tool used commonly to squelch political voices of minority groups is
gerrymandering. 6 While many scholars consider this a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,7 the ruling party in state after
state consistently uses this tool to disenfranchise African-Americans.
The same is true for felon disenfranchisement laws. While the most obvious
restrictions to the franchise have been eliminated by the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the most prevalent stays in tact: two percent of Americans cannot vote
because of a felony conviction - over 1.4 million have finished serving their time
- and one-third of that population is composed of black men.8 While this is by
definition disenfranchisement, challenges to these laws have been unsuccessful.
Courts have ruled that the Equal Protection Clause just simply does not prevent
this particular form of disenfranchisement. The Voting Rights Act (VRA), and its
guarantee of universal suffrage, has yet to alleviate these discriminatory results
because the applicability of the statute has been questioned. Though the states
are divided on the VRA issue, the Supreme Court remains silent.
The most recent case to appeal to the Supreme Court with a challenge to criminal disenfranchisement laws was Johnson v. Bush.9 This Note argues that the
Court should review this case for two reasons. 10
First, the Court should review it to have the opportunity to overrule its decision in Richardson v. Ramirez, 1 1 and determine that felon disenfranchisement
laws should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny despite the Rebellion Clause the mention of criminal disenfranchisement in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, the Court should settle the conflict among states on
whether the VRA applies to felon disenfranchisement laws that disproportionately affect African-Americans, and find that Congress's interest in preventing
racial discrimination outweighs any right a state has to punish criminals with
disenfranchisement.
In Part I, this Note will survey the history of the right to vote, felon disenfranchisement laws, and the racial impact of such laws. Part II will explore three
legal challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws through claims based on violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act. Part III presents
the Note's argument and analysis through a discussion of the Supreme Court's
rationale in Richardson and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Bush.
6 Gerrymandering is the deliberate manipulation of electoral district boundaries to the advantage of particular parties.
7 Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting As Illegal, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at
Al.
8 Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement 1
(1998), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/.
9 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
10 Although the Court denied certiorari in Johnson as this Note went to print, the analysis in
the Note remains relevant. See discussion infra Part V.
11 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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I.
A.

BACKGROUND

A FundamentalRight to Vote

A republican democracy - like the United States - is defined by its representa-

tive government. As Chief Justice Warren wrote, "The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.".! 2 He

characterizes this right as fundamental because it is preservative of all other
Court has repeatedly affirmed that voting is a fundamental
rights. 13 The Supreme
14

political right.
While states are afforded the power to qualify access to the poll, restrictions

on the franchise require a heightened form of judicial review, strict scrutiny. 15 A
strict scrutiny review, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, would find unconstitutional the denial of rights to a particular group
where the exclusion is not necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 16 To
exclude a group or class of individuals from the franchise, a state would need to

demonstrate that the restriction advances a compelling interest and that, in pursuing that interest, the state has chosen narrowly tailored and least restrictive

cannot "unnecessarily burden or remeans to achieving it. 17 The means chosen
18
strict constitutionally protected activity."
Congress sought to protect the right to vote with the Voting Rights Act of
1965.19 Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments extended the right
to vote to males regardless of race, the barriers created since Reconstruction to

keep African-Americans from voting are well-documented. 2 0 These measures in12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
13 Id. at 561-62 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
14 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
15 See Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1361-62 (2003) [hereinafter Ballots and Bullets] (discussing, generally, Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)). See also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 ("[A]ny alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972) ("[B]efore that right (to vote) can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the
assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
16 Ballots and Bullets, supra note 15, at 1362, (citing Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337 (internal citation
omitted)).
17 Lauren Handelsman, Giving a Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement
Under the VRA of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1880 n.25 (2005) (citing Dunn, 405 U.S. at 342-43;
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 241-42 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
626-27 (1968)).
18 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343.
19 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1
(2000)).
20 Angela Behrens, Voting - Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative
Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REv. 231, 233 (2004) [hereinafter Voting].
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cluded physical intimidation and violence, literary tests, the poll tax, and felon
disenfranchisement. The Voting Rights Act was passed to ensure access to the
polls and enforce the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment. The language used in
the Act was purposely expansive, "[i]ndicative of an intention to give the Act the
broadest possible scope." 2 1 When Congress passed the amended VRA in 1982, it
"recogniz[ed] the near impossibility of proving deliberate and purposeful discrimination" and "put greater emphasis on effects than on intent." 22 The amended
language, therefore, was even broader, prohibiting any "voting qualifications or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a
23
denial or abridgment of the right ...to vote on account of race or color."

Adjudication of a "results claim" - a claim alleging a voting qualification resulted
in racial discrimination - disregards the state legislature's intent or lack thereof to
discriminate; "the only relevant inquiry is whether racial minorities 'have equal
access to the process of electing their representatives.' ,,24 Further, this test looks
to the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if the franchise is open to
participation by members of a protected class (i.e. citizens of a particular race or
color) .25
B.

Exclusion from the Franchise

Despite the highly protected right to vote, the United States disenfranchises
over 2% of it voting-age citizens due to a previous felony conviction. 2 6 Disenfranchisement for a felony or an "infamous '27 crime has a long history in English
and European law and therefore found a place in American law from the beginning. 28 States began to incorporate criminal disenfranchisement provisions in
21 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969).
22 KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 293.
23 The Act further reads, in pertinent part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied.., in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color .... (b) A violation of
subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
24 Developments in the Law, One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement,115
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1953 (2002) (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 36 (1982)).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
26 The Sentencing Project, supra note 4.
27 KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 162 (at common law, an "infamous" crime, was "one that prohibited the perpetrator from testifying under oath in court").
28 Id. at 162-63.
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their constitutions in the late eighteenth century. 29 By 1920, nearly all states had

some sort of law denying the vote to convicted criminals. 30 In southern states, the
vote was withheld for offenses less severe than the traditional infamous crime, in
an effort to target African-Americans.

31

The use of disenfranchisement laws is widespread, but "there has never been a
particularly persuasive or coherent rationale for disfranchising felons and exfelons.",32 Though traditionally the sanction was thought of as punitive, there is
no evidence that disenfranchisement deters crime, and states began to use the

rationale that disenfranchisement of felons was necessary to "preserve the purity
of the ballot box." 33 States still express the view that ex-felons could create a

voting bloc threatening to eliminate criminal laws. 3" The persistent idea behind
these claims, however, is simply that a convicted felon does not have the moral
standing to exercise the franchise; disenfranchisement "was a symbolic act of po' 35
litical banishment.
C. Racist Origins of Modern CriminalDisenfranchisement Laws

The use of criminal disenfranchisement laws rose significantly after the Civil
War, obviously attributable to the new citizenship status and enfranchisement of
freed slaves. 36 Southern Democrats during Reconstruction especially feared the
political weight of the African-American vote. 37 In response to the "menace of
negro domination," 38 violence and intimidation were commonly perpetrated

against African-American voters, but felon voting restrictions were among the
first widespread legal barriers used. States used criminal disenfranchisement to
'39
target "certain peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character
thought to distinguish African-Americans from whites. The "menace" remained
through the Jim Crow era; Alabama in 1901 amended its criminal disenfranchisement law to include "all crimes of moral turpitude," in an effort to target crimes
purported to be committed by African-Americans. n°
29 Ballot Manipulation, supra note 2, at 563.
30 KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 162.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 163 (citing Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (Ala. 1884)).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See generally Ballot Manipulation,supra note 2.
37 Ballot Manipulation,supra note 2, at 597 ("[A]Il nine of the Southern states that restricted
felon voting rights in the 10 years following the Civil War were governed by Democrats.").
38 Id. at 569 (quoting John B. Knox, president of Alabama's 1901 all-white Constitutional Convention, referring to the justification for the "manipulation of the ballot" in the state).
39 Id. (noting the racist intent of Mississippi's criminal disenfranchisement law, as stated in
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898)).
40 See id. The bill was introduced by John Field Bunting, who expressed the estimation that
"[t]he crime of wife-beating alone would disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes."
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Conjuring the chicken-or-the-egg quandary, it is significant to note that African-American incarceration rates have consistently exceeded that of whites since
the Civil War era and remains seven times higher today.4 1 The jump in rates
parallels the increased felon voting restrictions during the Reconstruction. For
example, while 2% of the Alabama prison population was nonwhite in 1850, 74%
was nonwhite in 1870 - though the nonwhite population in Alabama only increased by 3%.42 In the years since, states with greater nonwhite prison populations have been more likely to disenfranchise felons than states with a lower
43
proportion of imprisoned nonwhites.
D. Disenfranchisement Today
Today, criminal disenfranchisement is imposed in a variety of ways in the
United States. All but two states take the right to vote away from those currently
incarcerated for a felony offense.4 4 With the high rate of incarceration in this
country, that amounts to nearly 1.5 million US citizens.4 5 However, only twelve
states and the District of Columbia limit disenfranchisement to the incarceration
period; in the remaining 36 states, parolees remain disenfranchised. 46 Additionally, thirteen of those 36 states take the franchise from ex-felons4 7 - in some
states, only those convicted of particular offenses; in others, the franchise is restored after a certain period of time.48 In three states, ex-felons who have completely served their sentences cannot vote for the rest of their free lives.4 9
No country surpasses the United States in the number of felons disenfranchised per capita. 50 In total, about 4.7 million citizens have currently or permanently lost their right to vote as a result of a felony conviction. 5 ' This amounts
to 2% of American adults, but the percentage of disenfranchised adults reaches
4% in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming.5 2 Of
all those previously convicted of a crime who cannot vote, nearly three-fourths
are not in prison.5 3
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 560.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 596.
The Sentencing Project, supra note 4. Only Maine and Vermont allow prisoners to vote.
Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Ph.D., Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear2004, BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS

BULLETIN

1

(2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf-

pjim04.pdf.
46 The Sentencing Project, supra note 4.
47 Throughout this Note, the term "ex-felon" is used for persons who have been convicted of a
felony but have completed incarceration and parole periods.
48 The Sentencing Project, supra note 4.
49 Id.
50 Handelsman, supra note 17, at 1881.
51 Id.
52 Fellner & Mauer, supra note 8.
53 Id.
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E.

Racial Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws

The impact of these staggering numbers disproportionately affects black communities - exactly the original intention of the expansion of many felon disenfranchisement laws. While over 2% of American adults cannot vote due to a
felony conviction, nearly 7.5% of black American adults are disenfranchised. 54 It
is specifically African-American men that lose the right to vote in droves - over
one-third of the total disenfranchised population is black men.55 Of black American men, 13% could not vote in 2002.56 According to The Sentencing Project,
"given current rates of incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of black
57
men can expect to be disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime.,
In a country with a history of Congressional intervention to protect the African-American's access to the poll, it unfortunately gets even worse. Black men
lose the right to vote for life at alarming rates in several states. Nearly one in
three African-American men is permanently disenfranchised in both Florida and
Alabama.5 8 In Virginia, Mississippi, Wyoming, and Iowa: one in four.59
This high rate of disenfranchisement among black men comes from the fact
that African-American communities face "an incarceration epidemic." 60 Several
discriminatory practices lead to disenfranchisement. These include: a disparate
impact in drug policy, racial profiling, higher arrest rates among African-Americans, higher conviction rates, and discretionary sentencing. 61 Racial discrimination throughout the criminal justice system leads to a disproportionate number of
minority felons.
The disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws on African-Americans
has a significant effect on their collective voice in American politics. Consider the
2000 presidential election in the state of Florida. Over 600,000 Floridians could
not vote due to past felony convictions, while the margin of victory was a mere
54

Developments in the Law, supra note 24, at 1941 (citing CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF

MANZA, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT

LAWS IN THE UNITED

STATES 23, 50-51 tbls.1-2 (2001)).

55
56

Id. at 1940 (citing Fellner & Mauer, supra note 8).
Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration

and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 299, 307 (2005) (citing
Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the DisappearingVoters, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE"COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 51 (2002)).

57
58
59
60
61

The Sentencing Project, supra note 4.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 24, at 1945 (citing Feliner & Mauer, supra note 8).
See Ballots and Bullets, supra note 15, at 1364 (citing Fellner & Mauer, supra note 8).
Finzen, supra note 56, at 300.
See, e.g., Voting, supra note 20, at 244-45; Handelsman, supra note 17, at 1885; Daniel S.

Goldman, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57
STAN. L. REV. 611, 628-32 (2004).
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537 votes. 62 There is little question that black enfranchisement would have
changed the outcome of the election. According to a study by two sociologists, Al
Gore would have won the Florida election by more than 31,000 votes. 63 The
study also suggests that "since 1978, the outcomes in seven United States Senate
races would have been reversed [which] would likely have given Democrats control over the Senate throughout the 1990s.,,64
In the end, the effect of disenfranchising such large numbers of citizens, with
such a disparate impact, is that "more black men are disqualified today by [these
laws] than were actually enfranchised by the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. ",65 This is not a result the framers of the Civil War Amendments
likely anticipated. Yet, few ex-prisoners have been successful at using these provoting rights Amendments to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws.
II.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS

A.

ConstitutionalChallenge: Richardson v. Ramirez

Richardson v. Ramirez66 was the first case in which the Supreme Court gave
plenary consideration to the question of whether a state may constitutionally exclude some or all convicted felons from the franchise. 67 The three plaintiffs, who
were convicted of felonies and had completed their sentences and parole, were
denied registration to vote in California because of their convictions. 68 The plaintiffs challenged the California constitutional provisions that disenfranchised
felons, arguing that the restrictions were a denial of equal protection to ex-felons
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 The Court held that a state may
constitutionally deny the vote to ex-felons and, further, exempted felon disenfranchisement laws from the scrutiny required of other limitations on the
franchise by the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a state need not show a compelling state interest to justify the exclusion of ex-felons.7 ° The Court based its reasoning on Section 2 of the same Amendment which permits states to
disenfranchise on the basis of "participation in rebellion, or other crime," without
62 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Felon Disfranchisement and
American Democracy, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777, 792-93 (2002), available at http://www.soc.umn.edu/
%7Euggen/felon-disenfranchisement.htm.
63 Id. at 792-93 tbl.4a.
64 Ballots and Bullets, supra note 15, at 1365 (citing Uggen & Manza, supra note 62, at 789).
65 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over
Felon Disenfranchisement,56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2004).
66 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
67 Id. at 53.
68 Id. at 24.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 54.
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losing congressional representation. 71 From this language, the Court concluded
that "the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2,"
which distinguishes felon disenfranchisement from other state limitations on the
franchise.7 2

The Court determined, through a survey of the legislative history of Section 2
and historical facts about felon disenfranchisement in the states, that Congress
could not have intended Section 1, "in dealing with voting rights as it does ... to
bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from
the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which section 2 imposed for
other forms of disenfranchisement." 73 Many scholars have criticized this "unsound historical analysis ' 74 and the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, noting, for example, the critical difference between the common
law definition of a felony (subject to capital punishment) and the modern definition (subject to a year or more in prison). Regardless, most lower courts have
interpreted Richardson "as having closed the door on the equal protection argument ' 76 in a challenge to state criminal disenfranchisement laws.
B.

Race-based Equal Protection Claim: Hunter v. Underwood

Despite the holding in Richardson, an equal protection argument did succeed

against criminal disenfranchisement in 1985 with a claim based on racial discrimination in the case of Hunter v. Underwood.77 The case arose in Alabama in 19771978 when the plaintiffs, Carmen Edwards and Victor Underwood, were barred
from registering to vote. 78 They were denied voting privileges under Article VIII,
section 182, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which disqualifies from voting

citizens convicted of any of a list of particular crimes, which included numerous
felonies, nonfelonies, and "any infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude.",79 The plaintiffs, one black and one white, had each been convicted of
71 Section 2 provides in pertinent part: "But when the right to vote ... is denied ... or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
72 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
73 Id. at 55.
74 Id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 Voting, supra note 20, at 256.
76 Developments in the Law, supra note 24, at 1950 (citing Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 395
(4th Cir. 1981) (stating that Richardson clarified "once and for all ... that the power of the states to
disqualify for crime under §2 of the fourteenth amendment was not subject to the equal protection
constraints of §1 of the amendment"), vacated by 454 U.S. 807 (1981) (mem.)); see also Farrakhan v.
Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. Wash. 1997) ("Richardson suggests that the facial validity of
felon disenfranchisement may be absolute.").
77 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985).
78 Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 615 (11th Cir. 1984).
79 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 222.
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presenting a worthless check - a misdemeanor that the Board of Registrars determined involved moral turpitude. 80 The plaintiffs sought a declaration invalidating
section 182 as it pertained to misdemeanors, claiming the provision was adopted
to intentionally disenfranchise blacks and that the provision had the intended
discriminatory effect.8 1 One expert estimated that "by January 1903 section 182
had disfranchised approximately ten times as many blacks as whites. This disparate effect persists today ....

[Bilacks are ... at least 1.7 times as likely as whites

to suffer disenfranchisement under section 182 for the commission of nonprison
offenses.'82

The racially discriminatory impact of the provision was "indisputable,"8 3 but
to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court required a showing
that the provision was enacted with a discriminatory intent or purpose, citing
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.84 The District

Court found that disenfranchisement of blacks was a major purpose for holding
the convention at which the Alabama Constitution of 1901 was adopted,8 5 but the
state's permissible motive of "governing exercise of the franchise by those convicted of crimes" was enough to validate the provision.8 6 The Supreme Court
upheld the Court of Appeals' reversal, holding that in a mixed-motive case such
as this, where discrimination was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor, the burden shifts to the law's defenders to show the law would have been enacted without that factor. 87 Ultimately, the Court had no difficulty finding that racial
discrimination was the sole purpose for this provision of the Alabama Constitution due to evidence offered by historians about the movement to disenfranchise
blacks in the post-Reconstruction South and the "zeal for white supremacy [that]
ran rampant at the convention."88
The defendants' final argument was that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the State to disenfranchise criminals, including those who commit misdemeanors of moral turpitude. The Court agreed that there is an implicit
authorization in Section 2 to deny the vote based on "participation in rebellion,
or other crime" - per its decision in Richardson.89 However, the Court did not
believe that Section 2 was "designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimina80 Id. at 224.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 227-28. The Court in Arlington Heights stated, "[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact .... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 264-65.
85 See discussion supra Part I, § C.
86 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 225.
87 Id. at 228.
88 Id. at 228-29.
89 Id. at 233 (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)).
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tion. . .which otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 90 As the
Court asserted, "nothing [in the opinion in Richardson] suggests the contrary." 91
C.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Johnson v. Bush

The problem with the exception the Court carved out in Hunter was that, as
one scholar writes, "[tihe reach of Hunter was limited, since few states - and none
outside the South - had legal codes and track records that demonstrated intent as
clearly as did Alabama's., 92 The plaintiffs in Johnson v. Bush 9 3 encountered this
problem as they attempted to challenge racially discriminatory criminal disenfranchisement provisions in Florida's constitution. 94 They broadened their complaint, however, from an Equal Protection claim to include the argument that the
provision violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended in 1982.
The plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of all Florida citizens who cannot vote in Florida because of a past felony conviction, though they are finished
serving time. For their Equal Protection claim, the plaintiffs attempted to show
that, like in Hunter, racial animus was the motivation for the criminal disenfranchisement provision in Florida's constitution, originally adopted in 1868,
which states that "[n]o person convicted of a felony... shall be qualified to vote
or hold office until restoration of civil rights .... , Florida revised its constitution in 1968, however, and altered and reenacted the disenfranchisement provision. The plaintiffs did not allege the adoption of the provision in 1968 was
motivated by racial discrimination, but they did claim that the racial animus in
1868 remained legally operative despite the 1968 re-enactment. 96 In accordance
with the procedural posture of the case, the Eleventh Circuit court assumed racial
discrimination motivated the adoption of the 1868 provision, and concerned itself
with the 1968 provision. The court thus found that the precise question before it
was "whether a subsequent legislative re-enactment can eliminate the taint from
97
a law that was originally enacted with discriminatory intent."
Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim failed
under the two-part test in Hunter.98 According to the court, the plaintiffs proved
neither a discriminatory motive in the 1968 re-enactment of the constitutional
provision nor -assuming there was a discriminatory motive - that the legislature
would not have passed the provision without the discriminatory motivation. As a
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result, despite the severely disparate impact of Florida's felon disenfranchisement
provision,9 9 plaintiffs could not meet the narrow Equal Protection test as established in Hunter, descending from Richardson'sexclusion of felon disenfranchisement laws from the strict scrutiny required by the Equal Protection Clause.
Because racial animus was unproven, the court looked no further in scrutinizing
the law on those grounds.
For their Voting Rights Act claim, the plaintiffs alleged the disenfranchisement
provision violated Section 2 of the Act by denying African-Americans suffrage
based on race. The plaintiffs attempted to show that regardless of motive behind
the adoption of Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision, the provision violates the VRA under the "results test" of Section 2 of the Act because the state is
enforcing a "qualification" on voting that "results in a denial ... of the right of
any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color." 10 0 The court refused to apply

the Act to the felon disenfranchisement provision, again relying on the "affirmative sanction" in the Fourteenth Amendment of the exclusion of felons from the
franchise. 1°1 Interpreting the VRA "to deny Florida the discretion to disenfranchise felons raises serious constitutional problems," according to the court,
because this interpretation would allow "a congressional statute to override the
text of the Constitution., 10 2 Additionally, the court found that Congress had expressed an intent "to exclude felon disenfranchisement provisions from VRA
scrutiny. "103
HI.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court should review the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Johnson
v. Bush for two reasons. The Court should do so, first, to take the opportunity to
overrule its decision in Richardson and recognize that there is not an affirmative
sanction of felon disenfranchisement laws in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore such laws require a compelling state interest. Second, the
Court should address the conflict among states on the applicability of the VRA to
felon disenfranchisement laws, finding that it is appropriate and necessary to apply the VRA to these laws when, coupled with a strong history of discriminatory
purpose, the laws result in the disproportionate disenfranchisement of AfricanAmericans.

99 See discussion supra Part I, § E.
100 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
101 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1234.
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A.

Equal Protection Claim: A "Constitutionally Protected Right"?10

4

Since Richardson, the argument against the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause has been that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the
states to disenfranchise felons. The mere mention of criminal disenfranchisement,
however, is not an affirmative sanction of the practice. Section 2 and its Rebellion
Clause were included in the Fourteenth Amendment "largely through the accident of political exigency. '' 10 5 As Justice Marshall asserted in his Richardson dissent, the Republican 39th Congress feared increased congressional
representation of the southern states due to the abolition of slavery.' 0 6 Straddling
the two goals of decreased southern representation and increased enfranchisement of Republican-voting African-Americans, Congress gave southern states a
choice - they could give African-Americans the right to vote, or lose representation.' 0 7 Because the purpose of Section 2 was the enfranchisement of freed
slaves, the exclusion of other contemporary and traditional forms of disenfranchisement was to be expected. But the embedding of a concurrent practice in
the Constitution does not guarantee its eternal place in our country's notions of
justice and liberty. Noting the reasoning by Frederick Douglass that the Framers
of the Constitution fully expected the eventual abolition of slavery even as they
wrote provisions which acknowledged its existence, one scholar writes that "[the
Framers] were not merely concerned with creating a government and laying
down static concepts for its immediate maintenance, but also with the elucidation
10 8
of principles that would be applicable to generations of citizens to come."'
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to entirely refuse to apply the Equal Protection
Clause to felon disenfranchisement. The petitioner, and the Court, in Richardson
asserted that the Framers could not have intended to "prohibit outright" in Section 1 a practice which was expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation imposed by Section 2.109 This completely disregards the
role of the Equal Protection Clause. The clause does not "bar outright" any practices - instead, the Supreme Court has established modes of review for state practices to determine their constitutionality under this clause. Application of the
Equal Protection Clause to any disenfranchisement measure requires strict scrutiny by the court. Whether strict scrutiny applies to a particular practice, as Jus110
tice Marshall asserted in his Richardson dissent, is only a "threshold question."
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Once answered in the positive, the court assesses whether the state has presented
a compelling interest in excluding the particular group, whether the restriction is
necessary to further that "legitimate and substantial state interest," whether the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and whether there are other
reasonable means which are less burdensome on a constitutionally protected interest.11 1 The greatly important, otherwise constitutionally-protected interest at
issue here - the right to vote - deserves at least this judicial evaluation in any
situation. Therefore, even without a racially discriminatory motivation for the
implementation of felon disenfranchisement provisions, the provisions must withstand strict scrutiny. In Johnson, Florida must present a compelling interest in
denying ex-felons the right to vote.
As a result, the Supreme Court should find that the law in Florida cannot
withstand such scrutiny. The state's rationale for disenfranchising ex-felons cannot outweigh the disparate impact in Florida. The circuit court found that "Florida has a valid public policy reason for disenfranchising felons," but does not
state what that reason is, only noting that "[s]everal courts have recognized the
propriety of excluding felons from the franchise." '1 12 The defendants point to
both a theoretical purpose based on Locke's theory of the social contract and
simply state that it is reasonable that "perpetrators of serious crimes" should not
take part in electing law-makers and law enforcers.1 13 This rationale is commonly
used but is unsound. First, it rests on the incorrect view that the Florida felon
disenfranchisement laws touch only the "serious" criminals, rather than the reality that those convicted of less serious crimes are also disqualified. 1 4 Second, the
defendant's reason voices a reminiscent concern for the "purity" of the ballot
box. 115 The Supreme Court rejected "the premise that we can disenfranchise people based on predictions of how they will vote" saying that a subclass of voters
could not be "fenced out" based on their likely voting choices.1 16 Third, the proffered reason imposes on the criminally convicted a lifetime of conviction as a
"perpetrator" and political banishment, even when they have finished serving
their debt to society. This harsh result particularly exceeds any legitimate interest
the state might have in excluding "serious" criminals from the polls.
111 Id.
112 Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005).
113 Brief for the Defendant at 2, Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 0214469C) (quoting Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967)).
114 See Ballots and Bullets, supra note 15, at 1369 ("The irresistible political pressure toward
ever more criminalization means that much not particularly blameworthy conduct is classified as a
felony.").
115 See discussion supra Part II, § B.
116 Jamin Raskin, Lawful Disenfranchisement: America's Structural Democracy Deficit, 32
ABA HUM. RTS., at 12, 15 (Spring 2005) (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)), available at
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring05/lawful.html.
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Neither this rationale, nor other reasons for criminal disenfranchisement,
demonstrate the necessity of these laws to secure a compelling state interest. Disenfranchisement laws do not prevent voter fraud, create an informed electorate,1 17 or deter crime. They are not rehabilitative, nor are they necessary or
adequate for punishment, since they are imposed on all convicts "regardless of
the character of their offense." ' 1 8 Furthermore, while these goals may be valid,
there are other means to achieve them that are less restrictive of a constitutionally-guaranteed right.
The Court should recognize that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
"provides no warrant for circumscribing the reach of the equal protection
clause," because the Court has previously emphasized that the Equal Protection
Clause is "not bound to the political theories of a particular era but draws much
of its substance from changing social norms and evolving conceptions of equality.119 Florida cannot present a compelling state interest that necessitates the

mass disenfranchisement of African-Americans, and such a result should not be
sustained by the Civil War Amendments that originally guaranteed the AfricanAmerican vote. Some states have recognized that the history of disenfranchisement cannot justify the current state of such laws. 120 Unfortunately, we cannot
rely on the states to take care of this situation in a piecemeal fashion. The Supreme Court should, therefore, reverse its holding in Richardson that has kept
the Equal Protection Clause from applying in situations other than those with
obvious racially discriminatory intent. The states have been allowed to broadly
disenfranchise without a scrutinizing eye for too long.
B.

Voting Rights Act Claim

In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the Voting Rights Act's results test to Florida's felon disenfranchisement law. It based its decision on a few
weak arguments. First, it offhandedly referred to the fact that such laws "are
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and are a punitive device stemming from
criminal law," again citing Richardson.121 On the contrary, such laws as they are
currently executed do not have such deep roots in our history. Whereas 96% of
states had broad felon disenfranchisement laws in 2002, only 35% of states did in
1850.122 Traditionally, the degree of disenfranchisement varied according to the
particular crime - some warranted permanent disenfranchisement, while others
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brought on only a temporary exclusion.123 Also, felonies were traditionally punishable by capital punishment, 124 while today only one year of served time warrants the felon label. Current incarceration rates are comparatively high, as noted
above. Additionally, criminal disenfranchisement laws serve no punitive function.
Not even the defendants in this case referred to a penal rationale for disenfranchisement. Instead, the state interest put forth tends to revolve around maintaining the "purity of the ballot box" 125 and the fear that convicted criminals will
vote to weaken criminal laws.
Second, the court asserts that "all states except two have some form of criminal disenfranchisement provision., 126 While this is true, the court is using this
fact in a misleading manner to assert that Florida's law is typical of the nation. In
fact, Florida's law is atypical. Only thirteen states take the right to vote from a
felon who has completed their sentence - which is the action the plaintiffs in this
case are challenging. Furthermore, Florida is one of only three states that disenfranchise all ex-felons for life. What makes Florida's law even more disturbing is
the unusually large incarcerated population in the state. In 2004, Florida had the
third-highest number of prisoners, fourth counting the federal prison system, with
nearly 85,000 prisoners. 127 This reflects in the number of disenfranchised. While
the national average is a 2% disenfranchisement rate, Florida disenfranchises 4%
of its adult population. Moreover, in light of the claim - racially discriminatory
disenfranchisement - the unusual racial impact in Florida further discounts the
court's assertion. In Florida, one in three black men is permanently disenfranchised. Therefore, the court's reasoning for its argument that felon disenfranchisement is presumptively a valid state action is amiss.
Even if these arguments were strong enough to support felon disenfranchisement, they are out of place in a discussion of the applicability of the VRA to
Florida's felon disenfranchisement law. Though an action may be both deeply
rooted in American tradition and widely used today, a showing of racially discriminatory impact warrants prohibition by the VRA. Nothing in the VRA asserts that the length of time a disenfranchising tool has been in use, or the extent
to which it is used, overcomes the desire of Congress to eliminate practices that
deny or abridge the right to vote. The circuit court pointed to the Supreme Court
in Chisom v. Roemer 128 when it stated that "Congress amended § 2 of the Voting
12 9
Rights Act to make clear that certain practices and procedures" are forbidden.
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However, the court only points to the weak arguments outlined above as proof
that this particular practice by Florida was not one of the "certain" practices that
are forbidden, and to one additional argument: that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment affirmatively sanctions use of felon disenfranchisement laws.
The court sees an express constitutional permission given to the states to disenfranchise convicted criminals, as discussed above. Denying the state this "discretion to disenfranchise" raises serious constitutional questions, according to the
court, because it would allow a congressional statute (the VRA) to "override the
text of the Constitution."'1 30 Here, the court is misstating the interpretation that
the plaintiffs are urging, and therefore raising a constitutional question that may
not have to be raised. The difference between the plaintiffs' interpretation and
the court's parallels the difference between the plaintiffs' claims in Johnson and
the claims in Richardson.
The plaintiffs in Richardson alleged that provisions of California's constitution
which disenfranchised ex-felons (those who had completed their sentences and
paroles) were unconstitutional because they did not afford the plaintiffs equal
protection under the law - namely, that the provisions discriminated against the
plaintiffs as ex-felons. The plaintiffs in Johnson, however, are adding a claim to
this one - that the provisions in Florida's constitution discriminate against the
plaintiffs as African-Americans. Therefore, the VRA claim in this case ultimately
had nothing to do with the state's discretion to impose felon disenfranchisement,
and it does not challenge the constitutionality of discriminating against felons.
Instead, the VRA claim challenges the state's use of any means to effectively
discriminate against black citizens' access to the franchise, and the means in this
case are felon disenfranchisement provisions. The racially discriminatory "result"
of Florida's felon disenfranchisement provisions is a result that is prohibited by
the VRA - the denial of the right to vote to racial minorities.
The court goes on to say that despite the fact that felon disenfranchisement
laws are "constitutionally protected," the provision could still be challenged. 131 It
refers to the decision in Hunter that outlaws the use of such laws to intentionally
discriminate on the basis of race. 132 Therefore, the plaintiffs "have a remedy if
the state's provision violates the Equal Protection Clause. ' 133 Again, the court is
merging two distinct claims. Arguably, according to Richardson and followed
ever since then, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively sanctions
the exclusion of felons in granting the franchise; arguably because of that, a felon
cannot challenge her disenfranchisement under the Equal Protection Clause. The
felon would have no problem proving the elements; clearly the disenfranchise130
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ment law intentionally took the right to vote - a protected right - away from one
class of persons. However, Section 2 of the same Amendment - arguably - permits this form of discrimination, and the felon would not win her case. This is
indeed what happened in Richardson.
A felon who can show that she is purposely disenfranchised based on race,
however, could win her case. If she proved that the state passed a law or a constitutional provision disenfranchising felons, with the purpose of taking the vote
away from black citizens, she has again proven intentional discrimination, and a
form of discrimination that is apparently not sanctioned by the Rebellion Clause,
according to Hunter.
If a felon brings a case claiming that her right to vote has been denied because
of her race, not intentionally, but as a result of a voting qualification, she will not
win her case. This is not because she needs to prove intent - the Voting Rights
Act provides for disparate impact claims. So, why would she lose? According to
the court in Johnson, it is because Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment protects states' right to disenfranchise felons. But if the Rebellion Clause does not
sanction racial discrimination, again, as asserted in Hunter, why would it sanction
the racial discrimination targeted by the Voting Rights Act? This result is clearly
erroneous. If a felon can bring a discriminatory intent claim under the Equal
Protection Clause - despite the Section 2 sanction of felon disenfranchisement then a felon should be able to bring a disparate impact claim under the VRA. If a
plaintiff claims she is being denied the right to vote based on race, under the
totality of the circumstances, she does not have to prove intent. If the VRA effectively replaced the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of federal protection of the
right to vote, then the Fourteenth Amendment § 2's sanction of felon disenfranchisement should affect the VRA in the same way it affects the Equal Protection Clause - namely, that it does not allow states to discriminate on the basis of
race despite their felon status intentionally, under the Equal Protection Clause,
or effectively, under the VRA.
The Eleventh Circuit also argues that interpreting the VRA to apply to felon
disenfranchisement despite Section 2's "affirmative sanction" of such laws would
allow a federal statute to limit "a state's delegated power," instead of the Constitution doing so (through the Equal Protection Clause), as in Hunter.'3 4 As the
court discusses, however, Congress enacted the VRA pursuant to its power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 135 The Constitution gives
Congress the authority to enforce that same Amendment that arguably sanctions
felon disenfranchisement, but which also prohibits racial discrimination in voting. 136 By allowing Congress to enforce the Amendment's prohibition of racial
134
135
136

Id. at 1228-29.
Id. at 1227.
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 5.

A STRIKE AT THE HEART OF DEMOCRACY

discrimination, monitoring felon disenfranchisement laws through the VRA has
no direct conflict with the supposed affirmative sanction of such laws in Section 2
of the Amendment.
Furthermore, Congress's interest in protecting the right to vote should outweigh any state's interest in punishing criminals. Voting is the most fundamental
of all rights in a democracy. In Bob Jones University v. U.S.,1 3 7 the Supreme
Court decided that the federal government's "fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their
religious beliefs.' 13 8 The Court is called upon in this situation to also weigh competing values: Congress' interest in protecting the right of all citizens to vote, and
a state's interest in punishing felons. Here, too, the Court must determine that
Congress does have a "fundamental, overriding interest" in enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause's prohibition of racial discrimination that outweighs the supposed discretion given to states to disenfranchise felons.
When Congress passed the amended Voting Rights Act in 1982, it
"recogniz[ed] the near impossibility of proving deliberate and purposeful discrimination" and "put greater emphasis on effects than on intent., 139 The plaintiffs in
Johnson experienced that near-impossibility but should be able to rely on the
Voting Rights Act to correct this wrong, as the Act was intended to do. The
Court should defer to Congress's enforcement powers as well as recognize the
importance of eliminating racial discrimination affecting citizens' right to vote,
and thereafter apply the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement laws.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The national disenfranchisement of African-Americans signifies a crisis for democracy. The Constitution and Congress both provided tools to eliminate racially
discriminatory barriers to the franchise, but felon disenfranchisement remains
largely unchecked. The traditional usage of criminal disenfranchisement laws
alone does not shield them from current conceptions of equality, and that tradition is further marred by the racial animus that provoked the increased implementation of the laws. Citizens must have the right to vote, and the Supreme
Court should make a broad sweep across the national landscape of criminal disenfranchisement and declare that these laws must be closely scrutinized. Further,
the Voting Rights Act should protect African-Americans' equal access to the
polls as it was intended to do. To that end, the Supreme Court must find that the
VRA applies to the nation's felon disenfranchisement laws that have a racially
discriminatory impact.
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V.

ADDENDUM

As this Note was going to press, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
Florida case, Johnson v. Bush. 140 Although the argument that the Court should
hear the case is now moot, the analysis in this Note remains entirely relevant. A
challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws requires strict scrutiny of the laws in
question, and those laws with a racially disparate impact warrant application of
the Voting Rights Act. By denying certiorari, the Court declined an opportunity
to reconcile sections of the Constitution, by overruling its decision in Richardson,
and, further, it missed the opportunity to settle a national debate on the application of the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement laws. The Court should
take the opportunity to hear a similar case when the occasion arises in order to
address these issues and prioritize the tools of democracy.
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